Boston Employment Lawyer Blog

Employees who suffer workplace discrimination in violation of the Massachusetts Fair Employment Practices Act are entitled to recover four types of damages: front pay (the amount by which someone's future earnings are reduced by discrimination), back pay (the plaintiff's lost income from the time of the discrimination up to a jury verdict), emotional distress damages, and attorney's fees. These damages are compensatory damages, designed to compensate the victim of discrimination for the actual harm s/he suffered and no more.

Punitive damages are another category of damages provided by the Fair Employment Practices Act for the victims of unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, color, religious creed, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, or handicap. However, not all victims of unlawful workplace discrimination are entitled to punitive damages. Recently, in the case of Haddad v. Walmart Stores, Inc. , the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court clarified the standard for the award of punitive damages.

In Haddad, a jury awarded punitive damages to the plaintiff for the gender discrimination that she had suffered. The trial judge, however, took away the punitive damages. The parties then filed cross-appeals, raising numerous questions of law.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial judge's decision to take away the punitive damages was error. Simplifying a bit here, the plaintiff went on to argue that Massachusetts law permits punitive damages for intentional acts and, since discrimination is the result of intentional acts, any finding of discrimination is sufficient to support an award of punitive damages.

The Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") agreed with the plaintiff that the trial court's decision to take away the jury's award of punitive damages was a mistake. The SJC found that the the trial court judge may have based his decision on a belief that, in order to recover punitive damages, an employee must show that his/her employer acted with the knowledge that its actions violated applicable civil rights laws. The SJC said that, to the extent the judge's order relied upon that reasoning, it was in error.

The Supreme Judicial Court went on to clarify the circumstances under which a victim of unlawful discrimination may recover punitive damages. The SJC held that punitive damages in a discrimination case may be awarded only where the defendant's conduct is outrageous or egregious. In determining whether the defendant's conduct is outrageous or egregious, a judge or jury should consider several factors, including but not limited to:

(1) whether there was a conscious or purposeful effort to demean or diminish a class of which the plaintiff is a member (or the plaintiff because he or she is a member of a class);
(2) whether the defendant was aware that the discriminatory conduct would likely cause serious harm or recklessly disregarded the likelihood that serious harm would arise;
(3) the actual harm to the plaintiff;
(4) the defendant's conduct after learning that the initial conduct would likely cause harm; and
(5) the duration of the wrongful conduct and any concealment of that conduct by the defendant.

The Supreme Judicial Court suggested these five factors do not exhaust the list of considerations that may be relevant to an award of punitive damages in a discrimination case, but they do help clarify what an employee who is the victim of workplace discrimination should show if she hopes to recover punitive damages against her employer.

You can watch a video of the oral arguments in the Haddad case on Suffolk Law's website.

Employees who are victims of sexual harassment must take great care to protect their rights. The First Circuit's decision in Chaloult v. Interstate Brands represents a broadening of the Farragher/Ellerth defense, which allows employers to escape liability even when an employee has clearly suffered inappropriate and demeaning conduct over a prolonged period of time.

The Farragher/Ellerth defense is an affirmative defense arising out of two 1998 Supreme Court decisions: Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, and Burlington Industries v. Ellerth. For the Farragher/Ellerth defense to apply, an employer must satisfy two elements: (1) reasonable care was taken to prevent and promptly correct the harassing or discriminatory behavior, and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the preventive or corrective opportunities provided.

In June 1999, Bonnie Chaloult began working at Interstate Brands in Biddeford, Maine. In August 2005, Chaloult resigned after enduring a series of debasing remarks from her supervisor, Kevin Francoeur. Such remarks included:

• Accusing Chaloult of having sexual relations with her direct supervisor
• Complaining about his wife, his lack of sexual relations with her, and voicing his desire murder his wife
• Asking about the distance between her nipples
• Asking her if her nipples chafed or stood out like headlights
• Stating that her breasts were “melons” and “big hooters”
• Asking her to hold her breath and push her chest out
• Offering to go to her house and have sex with her
• Stating that he wanted to see how far she could stick an eclair down her throat, stating "[i]f there isn't enough cream in there, . . . I have plenty"
• Asking Chalout’s manager, “How long have you [two] been fucking?"

Francoeur made many of these disparaging remarks both in front of Chalout’s co-workers as well as her manager. Ironically, the employer had a policy requiring all managers to report sexual harassment and inappropriate conduct to Human Resources. Chalout’s manager failed to abide by this policy. Although Chalout's letter of resignation did not detail specific instances of misconduct, it made clear that she no longer felt comfortable working at Interstate Brands because of statements made by Francoeur.

Approximately one year later, Chaloult filed a lawsuit based on, among other things, the sexual harassment she suffered from Francoeur. Surprisingly, the federal District Court of Maine accepted the Farragher/Ellerth defense on the basis that Chaloult failed to report specific instances of misconduct during her employment. The First Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. In doing so, both courts failed to acknowledge the reality of the workplace. If your manager knows that your supervisor is subjecting you to such demeaning conduct, and fails to take remedial measures, how confident would you feel in voicing such concerns? Would you keep quiet to ensure to avoid possible retaliaton?

One of the most egregious fact patterns in a race discrimination case has presented itself against NASCAR. Maurica Grant, 32-year-old black female, worked as a technical inspector from January 2005 until her termination in October 2007. During her employment, Grant was allegedly subjected to a panoply of racially hostile and offensive conduct, which included:

• Being called "Nappy Headed Mo" and "Queen Sheba" by her co-workers
  
• Being told she worked on "colored people time"
• Enduring references to the Ku Klux Klan made by one particular race official
• Being asked, "Does your workout include an urban obstacle course with a flat-screen TV on your back?"
• Being forced to work outside more often than white male officials because her supervisors believed she couldn't sunburn because she was black
• Being instructed to duck as she passed race fans in the backseat of a carpool with one race official stating, "I don't want to start a riot when these fans see a black woman in my car"
• Being told, "Keep smiling and pop your eyes out 'cause we can't see you."
• Being accused of being gay when she rejected the sexual advances of co-workers

NASCAR terminated Grant approximately two months after she complained about how she was treated. For more information, please visit the Chicago Tribune article entitled, Mauricia Grant, NASCAR.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently finished prosecuting a case involving severe sexual harassment as well as gender and race discrimination against New York's landmark restaurant, Tavern on the Green. According to the EEOC, Tavern on the Green subjected female, black, and Hispanic employees to continual lewd and degrading conduct. Female employees were forced to endure demands for sexual acts as well as various forms of groping and inappropriate touching. Black and Hispanic employees experienced racial epithets and ridicule for their accents. The EEOC's evidence also suggested that Tavern on the Green retaliated against employees who attempted to assert their rights.

The EEOC, which brought the suit on behalf of 50 employees, was successful in securing a settlement of $2.2 million. As part of the settlement, Tavern on the Green is also required to establish a telephone hotline for employees to report discrimination complaints. In its Press Release, EEOC New York District Director Spencer H. Lewis made clear the duty that employers owe to their workers:

This case should remind employers to take seriously allegations of harassment and retaliation, especially where managers in positions of authority are involved in the misconduct.

According to Professor Marcia McCormick of Cumberland School of Law (Samford University), the lawsuit signified a victory for the EEOC's EEOC's E-RACE Initiative (Eradicating Racism and Colorism from Employment), which was launched in 2008 to eliminate race discrimination from the workplace by enhancing public awareness and through litigating unlawful employment practices.

For more information, please visit the New York Times' article entitled, Tavern on the Green to Pay $2.2 Million to Settle Harassment Claim.

Sexual harassment victims just scored a major victory before the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals in Ingrid Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide. Ingrid Reeves worked for C.H. Robinson Worldwide (CHRW) based in Birmingham, Alabama as a transportation sales representative from 2001 through 2004. During her tenure, Ms. Reeves states in her complaint that she was subjected to sexually offensive remarks in which her co-workers, the large majority being men, referred to women as "bitch" and "whore." It was also not uncommon for her male colleagues to listen to a local radio program discussing women breast sizes and pornography.

In bringing her claim for sexual harassment, Ms. Reeves faced an uphill battle because none of the derogatory comments about women were directed toward her. On this basis, the Northern District Court of Alabama granted summary judgment to CHRW, dismissing her case and preventing Ms. Reeves from going before a jury. Ms. Reeves appealed to the 11th Circuit, which had held in Walker v. Ford Motor Co. that racial epithets in the workplace could support a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, even where the derogatory statements were not directed at the plaintiff. In reversing the lower court's decision, the 11th Circuit extended its holding in Walker to the sexual harassment context:

The language in the CHRW office included the “sex specific” words “bitch,” “whore,” and “cunt” that ... may be more degrading to women than men. The subject matter of the conversations and jokes that allegedly permeated the office on a daily basis included male and female sexual anatomy, masturbation, and female pornography, all of which was discussed in a manner that was similarly more degrading to women than men. The radio programming that Reeves claims was also similar. Therefore, even if such language was used indiscriminately in the office such that men and women were equally exposed to the language, the language had a discriminatory effect on Reeves because of its degrading nature. Accordingly, just as the language in Walker was sufficient to support Walker’s hostile work environment claim because it particularly offended Walker as a black man, we hold that the evidence Reeves presented was sufficient to survive summary judgment on the “based on” element here.

This is a key victory for employees who must endure sexually hostile work environments. Under the 11th Circuit's decision in Reeves, employers will no longer be able to hide behind obtuse technicalities to avoid liability. For more information about this decision, please visit Law.com's article entitled, 11th Circuit OKs Suit Based on Sexual Language in Office.

Pregnancy discrimination, which is a form of gender discrimination, is becoming a hot button issue in 2008. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has filed a class-action lawsuit against Bloomberg L.P., the financial-services and media company founded by Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, on behalf of at least 54 women who accuse the firm of discriminating against pregnant employees. The suit puts Bloomberg L.P. in a familiar position, representing the latest in a series of discrimination and sexual harassment complaints filed against the firm since the 1990s.

According to EEOC lawyer, Raechel L. Adams, the number of women represented in the class action is likely to grow. As part of its continuing investigation, the EEOC is interviewing 478 Bloomberg L.P. female employees who took maternity leave at some point from 2002 to the present.

Monica Prestia is among those represented in the suit. According to the lawsuit, Ms. Prestia received the worst performance review of her career after giving birth to her first child in 2005. Thereafter, the suite alleges, she experienced hostility from a supervisor who could not have children and was asked by a different supervisor: “What is this, your third baby?”

Although Mayor Bloomberg remains the firm's majority shareholder, the suit does not name him as a defendant. For more information about this issue, please visit the New York Times article entitled, 54 More Women Accuse Bloomberg Firm of Bias.

It seems like common sense: a boss who incessantly stares at an employee's chest to the point that she must hold objects in front of her to deter his wandering eyes constitutes sexual harassment. The First Circuit in Billings v. Town of Grafton et al. agreed, holding that a secretary who alleges that a supervisor repeatedly stared at her chest could sue her employer for sexual harassment.

Nancy M. Billings began working as a secretary for Grafton Town Administrator, Russell J. Connor, Jr. in 1999. A few months into the job, Billings noticed that Connor would repeatedly stare at her chest during their conversations. In one particular instance, Connor stared at Billings' chest so many times in the first half-hour of her workday that she felt compelled to drive home and change her sweater.

Not surprisingly, other women who worked for the Town of Grafton also reported Connor's wandering eyes and objectionable conduct. Billings filed numerous complaints about her boss' misconduct to no avail. Rather than take remedial action against Billings' boss, the Town placed the blame on Billings, and ultimately transferred her to a different department under less desirable working conditions. In attempting to defuse Connor's actions, the Town of Grafton claimed that an ailment, called "alternating intermittent exotropia," caused Connor to essentially stare at Billings' chest.

Writing on behalf of the First Circuit, Judge Jeffrey R. Howard opined that Billings states a legal claim for sexual harassment:

We cannot reasonably accept, however, that a man's repeated staring at a woman's breasts is to be ordinarily understood as anything other than sexual. In arguing to the contrary in this case, the defendants rely on Connor's eye condition, coupled with the fact that others who worked with him "did not sense any sexual intent underlying" his "failure to maintain eye contact." While this might have some bearing on whether Connor's staring created an objectively hostile work environment, it does not mean that the staring cannot support such a claim as a matter of law, because "harassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex."

This case will be closely monitored as it progresses to trial.

Employers have found a new way to minimize the bad publicity that results from their discriminatory practices. Sexual harassment is no exception. Mandatory arbitration agreements are on the rise. Increasingly, employers require workers to sign arbitration agreements as a condition of employment. In doing so, employees give up the right to a trial by jury. As one woman's plight against Halliburton reveals, mandatory arbitration clauses are unconscionable.

Ms. Barker is a mother of five. To support her family, she took a job in Iraq working for Halliburton. She recounts her experience in an ABC News article entitled, Sex Assault Suit Vs. Halliburton Killed:

The manager of the camp kept making gestures of how if I wanted my safety to exist on the camp, that I needed to sleep with him, and that's all he kept saying to me. ... On my way into the office, there was pictures of prostitutes and animals having sex pasted in the hallway. Our office was just wallpapered with pornography. There was not one space of wall at all.

Not surprisingly, Ms. Barker filed claims against Halliburton for, among other things, sexual harassment. Halliburton, however, had an ace up its sleeve. In order to be hired, Halliburton required Ms. Barker to sign a mandatory arbitration agreement. On February 6, 2008, a judge in Texas ruled that, per the terms of the agreement, Ms. Barker's case must be heard in arbitration.

The United States Constitution recognizes the right to a jury trial as a fundamental civil liberty. Hopefully someday, the courts will do the same.

The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in two promising cases. In both cases, the Court of Appeals ruled against the plaintiff-employee. One case involves the protection of employees from retaliation. We wrote about this case in a post on January 14, 2007 entitled, Title VII Sexual Harassment Case May Find Itself on the Supreme Court Docket. The other case involves evidentiary burdens in age discrimination suits where the employer alleges legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for a layoff.

In the first case, the employer asked an employee to cooperate in an investigation regarding sexual harassment in the workplace, who was fired after telling investigators that she had seen her co-worker engage in a series of inappropriate acts. In what has been criticized as a cramped interpretation of Title VII, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that cooperating with the investigation did not constitute "opposition" to sexual harassment. Click here for the Sixth Circuit's decision.

The second case deals with age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. There, the employer conducted a reduction in force in which 31 employees were let go. All RIF'd employees, save for one, were 40 years old or older. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately overturned the jury verdict in favor of the employees on the basis that they failed to disprove the employer's business necessity defense. Click here for the Second Circuit's decision.

The New York Times reported on both cases in an article entitled, Justices Add More Cases on Job Discrimination.

The Supreme Court's docket in 2008 may include a case out of Nashville, TN involving sexual harassment. An article out of the Tennessean gives a synopsis of the facts:

The case began in 2002, when Vicky Crawford, then a payroll supervisor who had worked for the school system for 30 years, was contacted by school officials looking into allegations of sexual misconduct against Gene Hughes, then the schools' employee relations director.Crawford told investigators that she had seen Hughes grab his crotch in her presence, that he had asked to see her breasts, and on one occasion, he grabbed her head and tried to force it into his groin. At the time, Hughes was responsible for investigating all claims of sexual harassment in the school district. The lawsuit alleges that the internal investigation ended with no disciplinary action against Hughes. But Crawford, and two other female employees who cooperated with the probe, were fired, the suit says.

Title VII prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against employees who oppose unlawful employment practices such as sexual harassment. At issue in Crawford's retaliation claim under Title VII is the definition of oppose.

Crawford argued that she opposed Hughes' inappropriate conduct by cooperating with the school's internal investigation. In response, the school argued that Title VII's whistleblower provision was not intended to protect employees participating in an internal investigation initiated by an employer. Disregarding Title VII's broad remedial purpose, the district court and the Sixth Court agreed with the school's argument and dismissed Crawford's retaliation claim. Click here for the Sixth Circuit's decision.

If the Supreme Court grants certiorari, the issue will focus on whether an employee who is terminated after cooperating with an internal investigation in which she alleges unlawful employment practices states a claim for retaliation under Title VII.

The Knicks are having a bad year. Isiah Thomas' bad karma isn't helping. In October 2007, a New York jury returned a verdict against Thomas and Madison Square Garden (MSG) for sexual harassment. In a rare move only reserved for the most egregious of cases, the jury levied a punitive damages award of $11.6 million. In doing so, MSG received a clear message to clean up their act.

In 2000, the plaintiff, Anucha Browne Sanders, was hired by the New York Knicks as a marketing executive. In 2002, she received a promotion to Senior Vice President of Marketing. Thomas' tenure commenced in December 2003. Shortly thereafter, the sexual harassment began. In January, MSG fired Sanders after she repeatedly reported Thomas' inappropriate conduct.

Declaring the verdict a "travesty of justice," MSG vowed to appeal. The case was slated to resume in early-December before U.S. District Judge Gerard E. Lynch. Among the issues to be decided were Sanders' compensatory damages, which would involve a combination of lost back wages and future loss of income. Looming overhead was also the millions of dollars in legal fees that the Kicks would have to pay to Sanders' attorney.

Realizing that their defense didn't have a leg to stand on, the Knicks wisely chose to settle the matter instead. In settling, MSG avoided paying Sanders' legal fees and amassing more legal fees of their own. Reports indicate that MSG didn't catch much of a break on the punitive damages award. The final figure is rumored at $11.5 million -- only about $100,000 less than the jury's verdict.